Already broken SHA1 / Unsafe DSA1024 keys trusted by MX Linux

For interesting topics. But remember this is a Linux Forum. Do not post offensive topics that are meant to cause trouble with other members or are derogatory towards people of different genders, race, color, minors (this includes nudity and sex), politics or religion. Let's try to keep peace among the community and for visitors.

No spam on this or any other forums please! If you post advertisements on these forums, your account may be deleted.

Do not copy and paste entire or even up to half of someone else's words or articles into posts. Post only a few sentences or a paragraph and make sure to include a link back to original words or article. Otherwise it's copyright infringement.

You can talk about other distros here, but no MX bashing. You can email the developers of MX if you just want to say you dislike or hate MX.
Post Reply
Message
Author
TimothySimon
Posts: 93
Joined: Fri Sep 10, 2021 2:16 am

Already broken SHA1 / Unsafe DSA1024 keys trusted by MX Linux

#1 Post by TimothySimon »

MX Linux contains a lot of UNSAFE DSA1024 / SHA1 KEYS trusted by apt to deliver signed release files even from the official repos.
(DSA 1024 signatures generally use the SHA1 hash)

One DSA1024 key present even now in MX Linux (key id 630239CC130E1A7FD81A27B140976EAF437D05B5) was the matter of a HIGH Importance issue on Ubuntu, fixed back in 2016
( Ref: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+sour ... ug/1363482 )

Debian SHUT OFF SHA1 on 1 Jan 2017 ( Ref: https://wiki.debian.org/Teams/Apt/Sha1Removal )

So, just intercepting HTTP would be enough for anyone (not just the real private key holders) to deliver fake signed release files in the guise of http://deb.debian.org/debian (or any repo, all of which use HTTP).

1) SHA1 is KNOWN TO BE INSECURE AND IS ALREADY BROKEN AS OF 2017 !!!
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SHA-1
https://security.googleblog.com/2017/02 ... ision.html
https://shattered.io/

2) DSA1024 is VERY unsafe and can be broken anytime now.

MX Linux has many keys in /etc/apt/trusted.gpg and /etc/apt/trusted.gpg.d/*.gpg using these, and these are trusted by apt, even for signing release files on behalf of the official repos.

There are also many historic keys (like that or Warren Woodford from MEPIS, medibuntu), many individuals' keys (like Christian Marillat, Adam Blackburn, Hendrik Rittich), many companies' keys (Oracle Corporation, innotek GmbH, Opera Software) etc., in these places where apt trusts them.

There are 37 keys trusted by apt, most of which use DSA1024 with the ALREADY BROKEN SHA1.
I trust only 11 of these 37 -- the official Debian, MX and antiX keys.

EDIT: Those 2 Ubuntu keys currently used in MX are no longer used by Ubuntu. They are from 2004 and use the insecure DSA-1024 / SHA-1 .
( Ref: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+sour ... ug/1363482 )

The rest 26 are not trusted at all (at least in my case).

This is a CONSIDERABLE security threat, especially as SHA1 is ALREADY BROKEN

Code: Select all

$ sudo apt-key list
Warning: apt-key is deprecated. Manage keyring files in trusted.gpg.d instead (see apt-key(8)).
/etc/apt/trusted.gpg
--------------------
pub   dsa1024 2005-10-29 [SC] [expired: 2011-01-22]
      1F5C 2E81 5EC2 9445 3B15  233C D3F9 85C5 1A77 B3E9
uid           [ expired] Warren Woodford (MEPIS Maintainers) <dev@mepis.org>

pub   dsa1024 2004-09-12 [SC]
      6302 39CC 130E 1A7F D81A  27B1 4097 6EAF 437D 05B5
uid           [ unknown] Ubuntu Archive Automatic Signing Key <ftpmaster@ubuntu.com>
sub   elg2048 2004-09-12 [E]

pub   dsa1024 2006-11-23 [SC]
      64D1 5ADA FA81 B2C5 619B  3297 2EBC 26B6 0C5A 2783
uid           [ unknown] The Medibuntu Team <medibuntu@sos-sts.com>
sub   elg2048 2006-11-23 [E]

pub   dsa1024 2004-12-30 [SC]
      C598 6B4F 1257 FFA8 6632  CBA7 4618 1433 FBB7 5451
uid           [ unknown] Ubuntu CD Image Automatic Signing Key <cdimage@ubuntu.com>

pub   dsa1024 1999-10-03 [SC]
      1D7F C53F 80F8 52C1 88F4  ED0B 07DC 563D 1F41 B907
uid           [ unknown] Christian Marillat <marillat@debian.org>
uid           [ unknown] Christian Marillat <marillat@free.fr>
sub   elg1536 1999-10-03 [E]
sub   dsa1024 2002-08-26 [SCA]

pub   dsa1024 2007-02-07 [SC]
      64C3 6120 DA8D 91E7 378B  E79F 3916 C431 F809 94F6
uid           [ unknown] Stefan Lippers-Hollmann (sidux.com) <s.l-h@gmx.de>
sub   elg4096 2007-02-07 [E]

pub   dsa1024 2006-09-26 [SC] [expired: 2009-09-25]
      CD5A 9776 9F6E F4D9 EBCD  8F92 0334 3153 6A42 3791
uid           [ expired] Opera Software Archive Automatic Signing Key <hostmaster@opera.com>

pub   dsa1024 2007-06-04 [SC]
      6947 BD50 026A E8C8 9AC4  09FD 390E C3FF 927C CC73
uid           [ unknown] innotek GmbH (archive signing key) <info@innotek.de>
sub   elg2048 2007-06-04 [E]

pub   dsa1024 2008-09-13 [SCA]
      B80B CDE3 19EE 84E0 A353  E7CF FEC8 20F4 B8C0 755A
uid           [ unknown] Adam Blackburn <compwiz18@gmail.com>
sub   elg2048 2008-09-13 [E]

pub   dsa1024 2008-07-14 [SC]
      AF45 1228 01DA D613 29EF  9570 DCF9 F87B 6DFB CBAE
uid           [ unknown] Sun Microsystems, Inc. (xVM VirtualBox archive signing key) <info@virtualbox.org>
sub   elg2048 2008-07-14 [E]

pub   dsa1024 2008-09-14 [SC] [expired: 2010-09-14]
      A949 B28F 7A96 8063 6CA3  36DE 81D4 980F A170 4726
uid           [ expired] Hendrik Rittich <hendrik.rittich@gmx.de>

pub   dsa1024 2009-05-11 [SC]
      70C4 F178 C4AC 36D2 9A3B  52F0 3EFF 4F27 2FB2 CD80
uid           [ unknown] Steven Barrett <damentz@gmail.com>
sub   elg2048 2009-05-11 [E]

pub   dsa1024 2010-05-18 [SC]
      7B0F AB3A 13B9 0743 5925  D9C9 5442 2A4B 98AB 5139
uid           [ unknown] Oracle Corporation (VirtualBox archive signing key) <info@virtualbox.org>
sub   elg2048 2010-05-18 [E]

pub   dsa1024 2009-08-31 [SC] [expired: 2011-01-23]
      8526 E45F AF83 DE2F 634C  1909 F9A2 F76A 9D1A 0061
uid           [ expired] Opera Software Archive Automatic Signing Key 2010 <packager@opera.com>

pub   dsa1024 2011-01-22 [SC]
      565F 67CD 02BA 29CF 4F5D  5405 E6AD 81A8 B9FB E3CE
uid           [ unknown] Warren Woodford (MEPIS Maintainers) <dev@mepis.org>
sub   elg1024 2011-01-22 [E]

pub   dsa1024 2010-11-08 [SCA]
      EA29 BBBE 6A41 95E6 EF3C  E709 A40E 385D 15B0 B570
uid           [ unknown] aurelien (Be Free!) <ice.cube@gmx.com>
sub   elg2048 2010-11-08 [E]

pub   dsa1024 2010-12-08 [SC] [expired: 2012-12-07]
      DB3D FC6C 82D3 D79B 4590  F276 0393 B863 8C00 FC18
uid           [ expired] Hendrik Rittich <hendrik.rittich@gmx.de>

pub   rsa2048 2010-03-31 [SC]
      5929 601B 7779 956E 0117  749A 515F 1784 FFF0 6A93
uid           [ unknown] Dedinčanov archív balíkov (Debian APT repositary) <dedincan@slavino.sk>

pub   rsa1024 2012-03-11 [SC] [expired: 2013-03-11]
      255F 0237 51CF AA0F 3B78  F548 F4EA 6AF9 3465 FC9B
uid           [ expired] David deJong (Dave) <david@daveserver.info>

pub   rsa2048 2012-04-14 [SC]
      48A9 B686 96FF FD91 ED9C  5AD8 8982 541D FD08 FE04
uid           [ unknown] antiX (this is for the antix repo) <antix@daveserver.info>
sub   rsa2048 2012-04-14 [E]

pub   dsa1024 2011-11-08 [SC] [expired: 2013-01-11]
      5C68 6B8F D30F A0E6 AB7E  6DAE AAFF 4A5B 3360 64B5
uid           [ expired] Opera Software Archive Automatic Signing Key 2012 <packager@opera.com>

pub   dsa1024 2009-12-11 [SCA]
      3289 E2A9 7822 F308 E660  30F0 7DCA C92F 09F8 ECEF
uid           [ unknown] aurele (Free your Gnu !) <ice.cube@gmx.com>
sub   elg2048 2009-12-11 [E]

pub   dsa2048 2013-05-25 [SC]
      D95E 9BC9 3D63 42FA 4843  805E 0CA3 2171 3B07 EE13
uid           [ unknown] MEPIS Community Repository (CR Signing key) <repo@teharris.net>
sub   elg2048 2013-05-25 [E]

pub   dsa1024 2010-09-20 [SC] [expired: 2015-02-06]
      2920 868D C0F8 016A A35A  A0F8 E429 CCF8 6CE3 3D20
uid           [ expired] home:gottcode OBS Project <home:gottcode@build.opensuse.org>

pub   dsa2048 2014-01-21 [SCA] [expired: 2019-01-20]
      C8CF 3513 60C3 7394 5178  8AE5 81E7 7EAF 14E2 25A0
uid           [ expired] MX Community Repository <repo@teharris.net>

/etc/apt/trusted.gpg.d/antix-archive-keyring.gpg
------------------------------------------------
pub   rsa2048 2013-03-13 [SC] [expires: 2024-04-25]
      ED57 48AC 0E57 5DD2 49A5  6B84 DB36 CDF3 452F 0C20
uid           [ unknown] antiX Linux repo <repo@antixlinux.com>
sub   rsa2048 2013-03-13 [E] [expires: 2024-04-25]

/etc/apt/trusted.gpg.d/debian-archive-bullseye-automatic.gpg
------------------------------------------------------------
pub   rsa4096 2021-01-17 [SC] [expires: 2029-01-15]
      1F89 983E 0081 FDE0 18F3  CC96 73A4 F27B 8DD4 7936
uid           [ unknown] Debian Archive Automatic Signing Key (11/bullseye) <ftpmaster@debian.org>
sub   rsa4096 2021-01-17 [S] [expires: 2029-01-15]

/etc/apt/trusted.gpg.d/debian-archive-bullseye-security-automatic.gpg
---------------------------------------------------------------------
pub   rsa4096 2021-01-17 [SC] [expires: 2029-01-15]
      AC53 0D52 0F2F 3269 F5E9  8313 A484 4904 4AAD 5C5D
uid           [ unknown] Debian Security Archive Automatic Signing Key (11/bullseye) <ftpmaster@debian.org>
sub   rsa4096 2021-01-17 [S] [expires: 2029-01-15]

/etc/apt/trusted.gpg.d/debian-archive-bullseye-stable.gpg
---------------------------------------------------------
pub   rsa4096 2021-02-13 [SC] [expires: 2029-02-11]
      A428 5295 FC7B 1A81 6000  62A9 605C 66F0 0D6C 9793
uid           [ unknown] Debian Stable Release Key (11/bullseye) <debian-release@lists.debian.org>

/etc/apt/trusted.gpg.d/debian-archive-buster-automatic.gpg
----------------------------------------------------------
pub   rsa4096 2019-04-14 [SC] [expires: 2027-04-12]
      80D1 5823 B7FD 1561 F9F7  BCDD DC30 D7C2 3CBB ABEE
uid           [ unknown] Debian Archive Automatic Signing Key (10/buster) <ftpmaster@debian.org>
sub   rsa4096 2019-04-14 [S] [expires: 2027-04-12]

/etc/apt/trusted.gpg.d/debian-archive-buster-security-automatic.gpg
-------------------------------------------------------------------
pub   rsa4096 2019-04-14 [SC] [expires: 2027-04-12]
      5E61 B217 265D A980 7A23  C5FF 4DFA B270 CAA9 6DFA
uid           [ unknown] Debian Security Archive Automatic Signing Key (10/buster) <ftpmaster@debian.org>
sub   rsa4096 2019-04-14 [S] [expires: 2027-04-12]

/etc/apt/trusted.gpg.d/debian-archive-buster-stable.gpg
-------------------------------------------------------
pub   rsa4096 2019-02-05 [SC] [expires: 2027-02-03]
      6D33 866E DD8F FA41 C014  3AED DCC9 EFBF 77E1 1517
uid           [ unknown] Debian Stable Release Key (10/buster) <debian-release@lists.debian.org>

/etc/apt/trusted.gpg.d/debian-archive-stretch-automatic.gpg
-----------------------------------------------------------
pub   rsa4096 2017-05-22 [SC] [expires: 2025-05-20]
      E1CF 20DD FFE4 B89E 8026  58F1 E0B1 1894 F66A EC98
uid           [ unknown] Debian Archive Automatic Signing Key (9/stretch) <ftpmaster@debian.org>
sub   rsa4096 2017-05-22 [S] [expires: 2025-05-20]

/etc/apt/trusted.gpg.d/debian-archive-stretch-security-automatic.gpg
--------------------------------------------------------------------
pub   rsa4096 2017-05-22 [SC] [expires: 2025-05-20]
      6ED6 F5CB 5FA6 FB2F 460A  E88E EDA0 D238 8AE2 2BA9
uid           [ unknown] Debian Security Archive Automatic Signing Key (9/stretch) <ftpmaster@debian.org>
sub   rsa4096 2017-05-22 [S] [expires: 2025-05-20]

/etc/apt/trusted.gpg.d/debian-archive-stretch-stable.gpg
--------------------------------------------------------
pub   rsa4096 2017-05-20 [SC] [expires: 2025-05-18]
      067E 3C45 6BAE 240A CEE8  8F6F EF0F 382A 1A7B 6500
uid           [ unknown] Debian Stable Release Key (9/stretch) <debian-release@lists.debian.org>

/etc/apt/trusted.gpg.d/mx21-archive-keyring.gpg
-----------------------------------------------
pub   rsa2048 2021-02-06 [SC]
      7854 EF6B F0E8 CC66 5736  4CF8 F942 E0D4 E1C7 26CD
uid           [ unknown] MX-21 Repository <maintainer@mxrepo.com>
sub   rsa2048 2021-02-06 [E]
Everyone familiar with cryptography knows that DSA1024 and RSA1024 are unsafe . PERIOD. ( <= 80 bits of security )

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_S ... generation
NIST 800-57 recommends lengths of [at least] 2048 (or 3072) for keys with security lifetimes extending beyond 2010 (or 2030)
NIST SP 800-57 Part 1 Rev. 5 ( https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-57pt1r5 ) says that RSA1024 and DSA1024 have <=80 bits of security (Ref: Table 2 of NIST SP 800-57 Part 1 Rev. 5)
Also, note that algorithm/key-size combinations that have been estimated at a maximum security
strength of less than 112 bits (i.e., at ≤ 80, as shown in orange above) are no longer approved for
applying cryptographic protection on federal government information (e.g., encrypting data or
generating a digital signature).
- NIST SP 800-57 Part 1 Rev. 5 Section 5.6.1.1

BTW I think MX 21 should start using RSA4096 , not RSA2048.
Debian has been using RSA4096 from STRETCH (Debian 9) onward.

Even if it is not broken (no, it will be broken soon and SHA1 is ALREADY BROKEN) , it greatly increases attack surface , by trusting 37 keys which can validly sign release files and may deliver it in the guise of the official repo by intercepting the insecure HTTP over which the repos work.

This discussion is forked off from my post on the MX 21 Beta 2 thread.
SwampRabbit wrote: Fri Sep 24, 2021 4:01 pm @TimothySimon First why in the world are we pointing to NIST RMF stuff in this Beta thread. I’m not knocking any NIST SP (I mean someone was part of writing quite a few of them), but any standard or framework should not be blindly blanketed on anything just because.

It’s not like we have known compromised keys … like ummm… any Buntu based Distro, Manjaro, and a few others did (might still) awhile ago.

But I’m not worried and I’ll leave that for what it’s worth.

This discussion and any other should be moved out of this Beta thread and into something else like Chat.
BTW I got an old discussion on this (after a lot of searching) at viewtopic.php?f=104&t=64322
and I'm really getting worried.
EDIT: What I'm saying is that DSA1024 and SHA1 is INSECURE, and SHA1 is already proven to be broken. The old discussion had a lot of FUD, and it did not point out the insecurity of DSA1024 and that SHA1 was already broken in 2017.

Some more links to read:
https://github.com/jitsi/jitsi/issues/203
https://www.reddit.com/r/linux/comments ... _key_from/

Moderator: removed sizing, please don't shout
Last edited by TimothySimon on Sat Sep 25, 2021 4:22 am, edited 3 times in total.

User avatar
JayM
Qualified MX Guide
Posts: 6793
Joined: Tue Jan 08, 2019 4:47 am

Re: Already broken SHA1 / Unsafe DSA1024 keys trusted by MX Linux

#2 Post by JayM »

FYI see viewtopic.php?p=633670#p633670 for a similar discussion earlier this year.
Please read the Forum Rules, How To Ask For Help, How to Break Your System and Don't Break Debian. Always include your full Quick System Info (QSI) with each and every new help request.

User avatar
junoluna
Posts: 516
Joined: Sun Sep 29, 2019 11:53 pm

Re: Already broken SHA1 / Unsafe DSA1024 keys trusted by MX Linux

#3 Post by junoluna »

^

that is the same link the OP already linked to i think Jay and it has made him very worried indeed

i don't find the link especially worrisome after reading it.......i don't really understand it and worrying is bad for the ticker but the devs seem happy enough with the status quo

TimothySimon
Posts: 93
Joined: Fri Sep 10, 2021 2:16 am

Re: Already broken SHA1 / Unsafe DSA1024 keys trusted by MX Linux

#4 Post by TimothySimon »

JayM wrote: Sat Sep 25, 2021 3:08 am FYI see viewtopic.php?p=633670#p633670 for a similar discussion earlier this year.
Yes, I saw that. It was about the same topic, but was mainly FUD (especially viewtopic.php?p=634334#p634334 )

What I'm trying to say is that SHA-1 is ALREADY BROKEN in 2017 and DSA-1024 is no longer secure (can be broken anytime now).

MX Linux is still accepting such insecure algorithms that can be used to sign release files delivered over HTTP.

I hope there is someone familiar with cryptography in the MX Team, and I hope they will fix it soon.

FYI: The fix Ubuntu applied (in 2016) to the same issue in their keyring https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+sour ... comments/6

antiX-Dave
Developer
Posts: 372
Joined: Mon Apr 16, 2012 4:51 pm

Re: Already broken SHA1 / Unsafe DSA1024 keys trusted by MX Linux

#5 Post by antiX-Dave »

A good portion of those are inactive and/or expired. At least half of them can be simply removed from whatever packages they came from just as a cleanup routine.

TimothySimon
Posts: 93
Joined: Fri Sep 10, 2021 2:16 am

Re: Already broken SHA1 / Unsafe DSA1024 keys trusted by MX Linux

#6 Post by TimothySimon »

antiX-Dave wrote: Sun Sep 26, 2021 8:26 am A good portion of those are inactive and/or expired. At least half of them can be simply removed from whatever packages they came from just as a cleanup routine.
Thank you so much for the response.

I too think that it would be good to cleanup all these inactive, insecure (DSA-1024) and/or expired keys.

In Debian 11.0 (Bullseye) , /etc/apt/trusted.gpg no longer exists (all the keys are in /etc/apt/trusted.gpg.d/*.gpg )
In MX 21 Beta 2, all entries in /etc/apt/trusted.gpg are inactive and/or expired, and most use the insecure DSA 1024.

So, I think it would be a good idea to remove the file /etc/apt/trusted.gpg in the MX 21 ISO (just like Debian 11 Bullseye does).
(I'll wait for the opinion of the MX Team).

User avatar
anticapitalista
Developer
Posts: 4166
Joined: Sat Jul 15, 2006 10:40 am

Re: Already broken SHA1 / Unsafe DSA1024 keys trusted by MX Linux

#7 Post by anticapitalista »

FWIW antiX has followed the Debian way since antiX-19
anticapitalista
Reg. linux user #395339.

Philosophers have interpreted the world in many ways; the point is to change it.

antiX with runit - lean and mean.
https://antixlinux.com

User avatar
oops
Posts: 1619
Joined: Tue Apr 10, 2018 5:07 pm

Re: Already broken SHA1 / Unsafe DSA1024 keys trusted by MX Linux

#8 Post by oops »

TimothySimon wrote: Sun Sep 26, 2021 2:38 pm
antiX-Dave wrote: Sun Sep 26, 2021 8:26 am A good portion of those are inactive and/or expired. At least half of them can be simply removed from whatever packages they came from just as a cleanup routine.
Thank you so much for the response.

I too think that it would be good to cleanup all these inactive, insecure (DSA-1024) and/or expired keys.

In Debian 11.0 (Bullseye) , /etc/apt/trusted.gpg no longer exists (all the keys are in /etc/apt/trusted.gpg.d/*.gpg )
In MX 21 Beta 2, all entries in /etc/apt/trusted.gpg are inactive and/or expired, and most use the insecure DSA 1024.

So, I think it would be a good idea to remove the file /etc/apt/trusted.gpg in the MX 21 ISO (just like Debian 11 Bullseye does).
(I'll wait for the opinion of the MX Team).
+1
This cleanup routine has to be done ideally from MX17 to MX21 ( to decrease the attack surface)
Pour les nouveaux utilisateurs: Alt+F1 pour le manuel, ou FAQS, MX MANUEL, et Conseils Debian - Info. système “quick-system-info-mx” (QSI) ... Ici: System: MX-19_x64 & antiX19_x32

Post Reply

Return to “General”